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JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY DECISIONS
Department Editor: Frank Winter*
EXCULPATORY PROVISIONS IN AIR CARRIER TARIFFS
AND PRIMARY JURISDICTION
The recent case of Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.' raised the problem
of whether a court may decide an action involving an air carrier tariff
provision under which the carrier exempted itself from liability for any
loss or damage to certain kinds of baggage regardless of negligence. 2 The
court of appeals of the second circuit decided that the CAB has "primary
jurisdiction" in this case despite the fact that the Board has power only to
approve or eliminate such a provision from the tariff, and has no power to
grant money damages to persons whose baggage has been lost as a result of
the carrier's negligence. Thus such a person cannot get any practical relief.
The facts of the principal case may be summarized as follows: Mrs.
Lichten boarded defendant's plane in Miami, receiving at that time claim
checks for two small pieces of luggage. When she arrived at her Philadel-
phia destination, however, only one parcel was returned to her, while the
other piece was carried to Newark and there apparently given to a person
without a claim check. A week later the bag was returned to the airline,
which then returned it to Mrs. Lichten. She discovered a loss of over three
thousand dollars worth of jewelry, and thereupon instituted this suit. De-
fendant obtained summary judgment in the United States district court
which was affirmed by the court of appeals. The case was disposed of by
characterizing the issue to be the reasonableness of the disputed tariff
provision, 3 and therefore within the primary jurisdiction of the Civil Aero-
nautics Board.4
* Student Editor, Legal Publications Board, Northwestern University School
of Law.1 189 F. 2d 939, 1951 U.S.Av. R. 310 (2nd Cir. 1951).
2 The provisions in the tariff filed with the Board were: Rule 10;
Par. II. ". . . Money, jewelry, silverware, samples, negotiable paper, securi-
ties and similar valuables, or business documents will be carried at the risk of
the passenger."
Par. III. (A) "... no participating carrier shall be liable for the loss of,
or any damage to, or any delay in the delivery of any property of the following
types which is included in a passenger's baggage, whether with or without the
knowledge of the carrier: fragile or perishable articles, money, jewelry, silver-
ware, negotiable paper, securities, or other valuables, samples, or business docu-
ments; or any other loss or damage of whatever nature resulting from any
such loss, damage, or delay." 189 F. 2d at 940, 1951 U.S.Av. R. at 311.
3 For a discussion of the desirability, etc. of the tariff provisions involved
in the principal case, see 65 HARV. L. REV. 341 (1951).
4 Those statutory provisions pertinent to the decision are: CAA §404(a), 49
U.S.C. §484(a) (1946) : "It shall be the duty of every air carrier . . .to estab-
lish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable individual and joint rates, fares,
and charges, and just and reasonable classification, rules, regulations, and prac-
tices relating to such air transportation .... .
CAA §1002(a), 49 U.S.C. §642(a) (1946): "Any person may file with the
Board a complaint in writing with respect to anything done or omitted to be
done by any person in contravention of any provisions of this chapter, or of any
requirement established pursuant thereto. .. ."
CAA §1002(d), 49 U.S.C. §642(d) (1946): "Whenever, after notice and
hearing, upon complaint, or upon its own initiative, the Board shall be of the
opinion that any individual or joint rate, fare, or charge demanded, charged,
collected or received by any air carrier for interstate or overseas air transporta-
tion, or any classification, rule, regulation, or practice affecting such rate, fare,
or charge, or the value of the service thereunder, is or will be unjust or unreason-
able, or unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential, or unduly prejudical, the
Board shall determine and prescribe the lawful rate, fare, or charge (or the
maximum or minimum, or the maximum and minimum thereof) thereafter to be
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The doctrine of primary jurisdiction was first enunciated in Texas &
Pacific Ry. v. Abiline Cotton Oil Co.5 There the Court said that Congress
cast upon the Interstate Commerce Commission the job of seeing to the
uniformity and equality of rates. Therefore in a case where a shipper seeks
reparation from a carrier predicated on the reasonableness of an established
rate the federal commission must act primarily. The reason for this was
the fear that if the courts had the power along with the ICC to determine
the reasonableness of rates, a serious blow would be .dealt to the purpose
of the Interstate Commerce Act of insuring uniformity of treatment to all.
A determination by a court that an individual shipper may recover part of
the charges he has paid would result in an abhorrent non-uniformity with
respect to other shippers who have paid the rates.
Applying this doctrine of primary jurisdiction the court in the principal
case told Mrs. Lichten to exhaust her administrative remedies as to the rea-
sonableness of the tariff provision before resorting to a judicial tribunal.
The plaintiff argued that this was not a question of the reasonableness of a
tariff provision, but rather a question of an unlawful tariff provision to
which the CAB could not give approval in the first place - an issue that
the court should properly handle. To this the court replied that since there
was no provision in the Civil Aeronautics Act similar to the Carmack
Amendment of the Interstate Commerce Act,6 which prohibits the contract-
demanded, charged, collected, or received, or the lawful classification, rule, regu-
lation, or practice thereafter to be made effective ..
CAA §1002(g), 49 U.S.C. §642(g) (1946): "Whenever any air carrier shall
file with the Authority a tariff stating a new individual or joint [between air
carriers] rate, fare, charge for interstate or overseas air transportation or any
classification, rule, regulation, or practice affecting such rate, fare, or charge,
or the value of the service thereunder, the Board is empowered, upon complaint
or upon its own initiative, at once and, if it so orders, without answer or other
formal pleading by the air carrier, but upon reasonable notice, to enter upon a
hearing concerning the lawfulness of such rate, fare, or charge, or such classifi-
cation, rule, regulation, or practice; and pending such hearing and the decision
thereon, the Board, by filing with such tariff, and delivering to the air carrier
affected thereby, a statement in writing of its reasons for such suspension, may
suspend the operation of such tariff and defer the use of such rate, fare, or
charge, or such classification, rule, regulation, or practice . . .; the Board may
make such order with reference thereto as would be proper in a proceeding
instituted after such rate, fare, charge, classification, rule, regulation or practice
had become effective ......
5 204 U.S. 426 (1907). The Oil Co. sued the Railway to recover charges
paid in excess of "just and reasonable" charges, alleging the rates to be discrim-
inatory, preferential, and in violation of the long and short haul provisions of
the Interstate Commerce Act. The common law right to an action in the courts
in this sort of case was held to be superseded by the requirement for uniformity
of results under the Interstate Commerce Act.
6 ICA §20 (11) ; 49 U.S.C. §20(11) (1946) : "Any common carrier, railroad,
or transportation company subject to the provision of this chapter receiving
property for [interstate or foreign] transportation ... shall issue a receipt or bill
of lading therefor, and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss,
damage, or injury to such property caused by it or by any common carrier, rail-
road, or transportation company to which such property may be delivered ...
when transported on a through bill of lading, and no contract, receipt, rule, regu-
lation, or other limitation of any character whatsoever shall exempt such com-
mon carrier, railroad, or transportation company from the liability hereby im-
posed; and any such common carrier, railroad, or transportation company so
receiving property for transportation . . . or . . . delivering said property so
received and transported shall be liable to the lawful holder of said receipt or bill
of lading ... for the full actual loss, damage or injury to such property caused
by it ... notwithstanding any limitation of liability or limitation of the amount
of recovery or representation or agreement as to value in any such receipt or bill
of lading, or in any contract, rule, regulation, or in any tariff filed with the
Interstate Commerce Commission; and such limitation without respect to the
manner or form in which it is sought to be made is hereby declared to be unlaw-
ful and void .... 
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ing way of liability by the carrier, there is no question of illegality present,
but only one of reasonableness. As a result air carriers are free to contract
away their liability regardless of negligence to the extent that the Board
does not disapprove of such provision.
In a long, able dissent, Judge Frank disagrees with the majority on the
point of whether this case involves illegality or reasonableness of a tariff
provision. He concludes that the CAB is without authority to approve an
exculpatory clause. His argument is that the mere absence of a Carmack
Amendment type of provision in the CAA does not mean that exculpatory
clauses are not also prohibited to air carriers. The Carmack Amendment
was enacted to nullify state legislative and decisional rules on this subject,
and thus to make the law on the subject uniform for interstate transporta-
tion by substituting for them the federal common law, which already pro-
hibited carriers from contracting away their liability.7 Thus the argument
of the majority that a Carmack Amendment type of provision is required
in the Civil Aeronautics Act to render exculpatory clauses illegal is un-
sound.8 It follows, Judge Frank says, that Congress could not have intended,
by mere silence, to let the CAB approve tariffs contrary to hitherto uniform
federal policy.9
Since this case involves a clause illegal under the Civil Aeronautics Act,
Judge Frank next reasons, the CAB does not have primary jurisdiction,
and the district court should not have dismissed Mrs. Lichten's suit. This
result would be based on the rule that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
is to be applied only to cases raising the issue of the reasonableness of a
tariff provision, carrier action, etc., and not to cases raising the issue of
the legality of such a provision, action, etc. (Note that the Lichten majority
has no quarrel with this rule - it merely decided that there was no question
as to the legality of the exculpatory clause.)
This test for the determination of the instances in which primary juris-
diction should or should not be applied was first announced by the United
States Supreme Court in Boston & Maine Ry. v. Piper,1° and has since
7 Hart v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 112 U.S. 331 (1884).
8 The basic point of divergence between the majority and dissenting opinions
comes in the analysis by each of Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491(1913). The majority used this case to support the view that without the Car-
mack Amendment a carrier coming within the scope of the Interstate Commerce
Act could contract away its liability. An examination of the case, however, leads
to the conclusion that the dissenting opinion reached an essentially sounder view
in concluding that the Croninger case stands for the proposition that the Carmack
Amendment merely put into statutory form the federal common law, mainly for
the purpose of attaining uniformity by nullifying state rules. The action was
one against the express company, brought in a Kentucky court, and involved the
loss, during an interstate shipment, of a small package containing a diamond.
The defense was based on a clause in the contract limiting the liability of the
carrier to the declared value of the shipment. (That, of course, is different from
the exculpatory clause of the Lichten case.) Such a limitation clause was legal
under federal common law, but illegal under Kentucky law. The court held that
since the enactment of the Carmack Amendment, federal law must control exlu-
sively.
9 Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, supra note 8; Kansas City & Southern
Ry. Co. v. Carl, 227 U.S. 639 (1918); Boston & Maine Ry. v. Piper, 246 U.S. 439
(1918) (railroads); The Ansaldo San Giorgio I v. Rheinstrom Bros. Co., 294 U.S.
494 (1935) (water carrier); 46 U.S.C. §§190, 191 (1946) (water carriers); the
Carmack Amendment, supra note 6.
10246 U.S. 439 (1918). The contract limited the liability of the carrier
because of unusual'delay or detention because of its negligence to the amount
expended, for .-food .and water (hence not for damages resulting from the delay)
of the livestock: shipped. The shippei recovered on the ground that an attempt
to limit liability leaving no recovery for damages was unlawful and void. The
reasonableness-legality test was announcced Id. at 445.
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been applied by lower courts in the field of air law." The existence of the
test represents a recognition by the courts of two truths: (1) the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction has in many if not most cases produced such satis-
factory results, and has such strong policy reasons behind it, 12 that it should
continue to receive judicial support; (2) there are some instances, how-
ever, when an application of the doctrine leads to results that are most un-
fortunate and undesirable. The Lichten case is an excellent example of an
instance of the latter type - the plaintiff is told to go to the CAB, even
though the Civil Aeronautics Act gives the Board no power to grant such
a plaintiff money damages, the only practical relief she could get.
A test by which the doctrine of primary jurisdiction may be avoided in
some cases seems definitely called for. It is submitted, however, that the
rather mechanical reasonableness-validity test of the Boston & Maine case13
is unsatisfactory. It is not a necessary result of the test that the administra-
tive body gets cases which, for various reasons of policy, 14 it should be
required to handle exclusively or primarily. Nor is it a necessary result of
the test that persons like Mrs. Lichten, who can get adequate relief only in
the courts, will have their day in court.15
11 In Pacific Northern Airlines, Inc. v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 80 *F. Supp.592, 1948 U.S.Av.R. 542 (D. Alaska (1948), an irregular carrier whose certificate
allowed flights only within Alaska had been operating flights between Alaska
and the -United States. Under, CAB Regulations the carrier had been exempted
from the operation of CAA §401, 49 U.S.C. §481 (1946), which regulates common
carriers, and required, inter alia, CAB certificates to engage in air transport
between any two points. The court decided that it had jurisdiction here to enjoin
the carrier's Alaska-United States flights, saying that the CAB-granted exemp-
tion from the operation of §401 protected the carrier only while it remained
within the boundaries of its exemption (Alaska), and not outside its boundaries.
In CAB v. Modern Air Transport, Inc., 179 F. 2d 622 (2nd Cir. 1950), the de-fendant admitted it was no longer an irregular carrier, but denied the jurisdiction
of the court to enjoin its operations as an irregular carrier until the CAB revoked
its letter of registration. The court said it had original jurisdiction to inter-
pret tariffs, rules and practices where the issue is one of violation rather than
reasonableness. (Note that in both cases the CAB expressed the view that the
court's jurisdiction was properly invoked.)
12 For a discussion of the policy considerations, see Note, 51 HARv. L. REV.
1251, 1253 (1938), as well as the discussion in this comment infra.
13 Supra note 10.
14 See note 12 supra.
15 The cases in the air law field involving anti-trust law show a tendency,
resulting from an extreme application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
to confuse the scope of the "anti-trust" sections of the CAA with the general
anti-trust law of the Sherman Act. In Trans-Pacific Airlines, Ltd. v. Hawaiian
Airlines, Ltd., 174 F. 2d 63, 1949 U.S.Av.R. 196 (9th Cir. 1949), the court said its
injunctive relief must await determination by the Board whether the matter was
within the Board's scope of authority; after an economic decision the court would
rule on the applicable law. But since the Board had no authority to enjoin and
could only order the defendant to cease and desist from its practice, if found
to be discriminatory,' the court's reluctance seems strange. The Civil Aeronautics
Act explicitly gave the court authority to decide the case since a conspiracy in
restraint of trade was alleged and the Board had no sanctions over -such act. The
case of S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transportation Ass'n of America, 191 F. 2d 658, 1951
U.S.Av.R 289 (D.C. Cir. 1951), illustrates the extent to which the doctrine is
applied. This was a prayer for injunction and treble damages by an independent
non-scheduled airline under the anti-trust laws. The court held, after saying
that the anti-trust laws are effective outside the scope of the Board's power to
give a remedy, that the anti-trust laws and the CAA provisions are alike. Thus
the Board must first give relief. A conspiracy had been alleged; yet in line
with the "fundamental policy" the Board must render an opinion even though
it has power only to approve mergers, etc., and no power to approve a conspiracy
in restraint of trade, or to give a civil remedy like an injunction or damages.
The court did hold, however, that it will award damages and grant injunctions
if the Board finds a violation of the CAA provisions. See Comment, 18 J. AIR
L. & COM. 238 (1951). For a case involving substantially similar facts, but
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A more desirable test would be one by,which the court would look at
the type of case before it and determine whether the various policy reasons
which call for an application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction - de-
sirability of uniform treatment,16 need of skilled administrative officers to
deal with technical problems, 17 etc.' 8 - are present. If they are present the
doctrine should be applied, but if they are not present, the courts should
hear the cases, especially when, as in the principal case, the plaintiff can-
not get adequate relief otherwise. 19
This test would be applied to the Lichten case in the following manner.
The general policy reasons for primary jurisdiction, especially the uni-
formity-of- treatment- for- air-carriers-and-users-of-air-facilities argument,
could be met by the counter argument that here the plaintiff is not a member
of a large class of persons similarly affected (like the plaintiff in the Abiline
case20 was) for which uniformity of treatment is essential to carry out the
policy of the act establishing the administrative body. She is, rather, a
member of a small class, whose rights, justice demands,'ought to be similar
to those of an ordinary litigant confronted with an illegal contract term. 21
Then a further argument in favor of applying the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction in the principal case might be one which relates specially to
the field of air law. It might be argued that since the CAB has the duty
not only of regulating, but also of encouraging and promoting air trans-
portation,22 it should have primary jurisdiction over the problem of the
Lichten case, since the fear of incurring vast liabilities may be a factor
discouraging the expansion of air transportation. A counter argument to
this would be that railroads, motor carriers, and water carriers have not
reaching a result diametrically opposite to that of the S.S.W. case on the primaryjurisdiction question, see Slick Airways, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., -F.
Supp. -, 1951 U.S.Av.R. 300 (D.N.J. 1951).
16 See Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Abiline Cotton Oil Co., supra note 5.
17 See CAB v. Modern Air Transport, Inc., 179 F. 2d 622, 624 (2nd Cir. 1950);
Trans-Pacific Airlines, Ltd. v. Hawaiian Airlines, Ltd., 174 F. 2d 63, 66, 1949
U.S.Av.R. 196, 200-1 (9th Cir. 1949).
18 See Note cited in note 12 supra.
19 One other factor that might be considered by the courts here is the condi-
tion of the court dockets and the administrative board's dockets. See McAllister,
Statutory Roads to Review of Federal Administrative Orders, 28 CALIF. L. REV.
129, 143, 147 (1940).
20 Supra note 5.
21 This is substantially the argument used in King, The Effects of Tariff
Provisions: Some Further Observations, 16 J. AIR L. & CoM. 174, 177-78, 181-83
(1949).
22 CAA §2, 49 U.S.C. §402 (1946): "Declaration of Policy.
"In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under this chapter,
the Board shall consider the following, among other things, as being in the public
interest, and in accordance with the public convenience and necessity-
"(a) The encouragement and development of an air-transportation system
properly adapted to the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic
commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
"(b) The regulation of air transportation in such a manner as to recognize
and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest degree of safety in,
and foster sound economic conditions in, such transportation, and to improve the
relations between, and coordinate transportation by, air carriers;
"(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service by air
carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue prefer-
ences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices;
"(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development
of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and
domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service and of the national
defense;
. "(e) The regulation of air commerce in such a manner as to best promote its
development and safety; and
"(f) The encouragement and development of civil aeronautics."
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
been permitted to relieve themselves of liability23 ; yet they have not become
subject to ruinous claims on the part of injured users.24 The very remote
chance that a different result would obtain in the field of air transportation
seems to be of little weight when balanced against the injustice of having
a person in Mrs. Lichten's position become a remediless victim of an air
carrier's negligence. 25
DIGEST OF RECENT CASES
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - CAB ORDER GRANTING ONE OF TWO
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE ROUTE APPLICATIONS - HEAR-
INGS FOR BOTH APPLICANTS IN ADVANCE OF ORDER
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. CAB,
F. 2d, 20 L.W. 2313, D.C. Cir. (January 18, 1952).
The CAB said that the orders were not mutually exclusive because the
award of the route to one airline does not preclude a subsequent grant of
the other application. The court of appeals reversed, relying on Ashbacker
Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945), thus requiring the Board to give
all applicants a hearing prior to the Order. In this way it held that the test
for mutual exclusiveness because of economic conditions should be as of
the time the applications are considered and an award is being made.
EVIDENCE - PRIVILEGE - JUDICIAL POWER - MILITARY
PLANE CRASH - PRODUCTION OF REPORT OF
OFFICIAL CRASH INVESTIGATION
Reynolds v. United States; 192 F. 2d 987, 3rd Cir. (December 11, 1951).
This is an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act arising out of a
military plane crash in which several civilian observers were killed. The
government refused to produce the report of the official crash investigation
for inspection by the district court to ascertain whether such report was
of a privileged character. The ground for refusal was that under 5 U.S.C.
§22 (1946) it is within the sole province of the Secretary of the Air Force
to determine whether there is privileged material in such report, and that
the Secretary has determined that the policy of insuring collection of all
pertinent information regarding aircraft accidents in order to maximize
the promotion of flying safety, requires that such reports should not be
released for use in litigation. The court, however, held that the claim of
privilege against disclosing evidence involves a justiciable question, de-
terminable by the court in camera. It further held that such crash investi-
gation reports should not be privileged per se, saying that whatever public
interest there may be in avoiding disclosure of such reports to promote
accident prevention must yield to what Congress, in passing the Federal
Tort Claims Act, evidently regarded as the greater public interest of seeing
justice done to those injured by governmental operations. The court found
that the plaintiffs here had good cause in asking the United States to pro-
23 See note 9 supra.
24 See Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F. 2d 939, 945, 1951 U.S.Av.R.
310, 319 (2nd Cir. 1951) (dissenting opinion). Judge Frank suggests that de-
fendant might have provided in the tariff, with CAB approval, that its liability
for items contained in a passenger's baggage would be limited to a certain rea-
sonable amount, unless the passenger gave notice of the presence of valuables
in his baggage and paid an additional sum for its transportation.25 See Judge Frank supra at 947-48, 1951 U.S.Av.R. at 322-24.
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duce the reports, since all knowledge obtainable was in the hands of the
United States. The court therefore decided that the refusal to produce the
documents justified the district court's order under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 37(b) (2) that certain facts relating to the issue of negligence
be taken as established against the United States.
NEGLIGENCE - BURDEN OF PROOF -- EVIDENCE - CAB INVES-
TIGATOR'S REPORT - AIR CARRIER ACCIDENT -
INJURIES TO PASSENGER
Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc.,
192 F. 2d 217, 1951 USAvR 428, 2nd Cir. (October 30, 1951), cert. denied,
72 S. Ct. 558 (1952).
Plaintiff was injured in Indiana when defendant's plane, in which he
was a passenger, crashed. The trial took place in a federal district court
in New York, where there was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The
court of appeals found error in the trial judge's charge to the jury that
proof of happening of the accident gives rise to the presumption that the
accident occurred because of the negligence of the air carrier. Under New
York law (which governs because New York law is that burden of proof
is procedural, not substantive) the rule of res ipsa loquitur is a matter of
inference which the jury may draw from the evidence, but is not required
to draw. The burden of proof remains in the plaintiff.
The court of appeals found no error in the admission of the CAB inves-
tigator's report despite §701(e) of the CAA which apparently prohibits the
use of such report as evidence in any suit growing out of the matter men-
tioned in the report. The court based its view on the fact that this par-
ticular report contained only the investigator's personal observations of the
condition of the plane after the accident, and contained no hearsay, or agency
views on matters which properly courts and juries should decide. Thus,
the court said, in this case the policy reasons for §701(e) did not arise.
TORTS - INJURY TO AIRPLANE PASSENGER - LIABILITY OF
OWNER FOR PILOT'S NEGLIGENCE
Grain Dealers National Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Harrison, Jr.,
190 F. 2d 726, 1951 USAv R 515, 5th Cir. (June 30, 1951).
A passenger was injured when the insurance company's airplane
bounced on the runway in landing at Leesburg, Florida. The court found
that the pilot, the company's special agent, was negligent in not using
ordinary care in operating the airplane. It then held that since, under
Florida law, an airplane.may be classified as "a dangerous agency while in
operation," its owner is responsible for the manner in which it is used,
and his liability extends to its use by anyone with his knowledge or consent.
REAL PROPERTY - THREAT OF CONDEMNATION - PROPERTY
ADJACENT TO AIRPORT - LOW FLYING AIRPLANES
Hepstead Warehouse Corp. v. United States,
98 F. Supp. 572, Ct. Cl. (July 9, 1951).
(1) The mere threat to condemn land for an airport is not a taking, and
there can be no liability thereon by the United States, even though as a
result of the threat plaintiff's land was less marketable. (2) The mere
fact that airplanes fly low over plaintiff's land is not enough under United
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States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), to make the United States liable in
damages. Plaintiff must show that the low flying actually injured him, or
prevented him from using his land as he wished to.
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION - INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT -
WARSAW CONVENTION
Salamon v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij, N. V., Misc.,
107 N.Y.S. 2d 768, 1951 USAv R 378 (September 28, 1951).
This is a wrongful death action arising out of defendant Dutch Air-
line's operation of an airplane in which decedent was a passenger from the
Netherlands to New York. Defendant's alleged misconduct took place over
the high seas and over New York. The court held that the plaintiff had a
good cause of action under the provisions of the Warsaw Convention of
1929, 49 STAT. 3000 (1934) (to which both the United States and the
Netherlands are signatories), which regulates and limits the liability of air
carriers engaged in international transportation. The plaintiff's cause of
action arose, it was held, under Articles 17 and 27. The law to be applied
is that set forth by the Convention, even if inconsistent with the law of
the place. For this reason it was held that the plaintiff need not plead the
law of the Netherlands, and had no cause of action under the local law of
New York.
TORTS - MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY - LATENT DEFECT IN
AIRPLANE ENGINE
Livesley v. Continental Motors Corp.,
- Mich. - , 49 N.W. 2d 365 (October 2, 1951).
An airplane crash was caused by a breakdown of the engine due to a
latent defect in a connecting rod. The pilot brought suit against the manu-
facturer of the engine. There was a verdict and judgment for the defendant,
affirmed by the supreme court, because (a) plaintiff was unable to prove
that the defendant could have discovered the latent defect by reasonable
diligence, thus not meeting the test for manufacturer's liability of Mac
Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); and (b)
defendant proved his method of inspection conformed to CAA standards.
REAL PROPERTY - FEDERAL POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN -
CONSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC AIRPORT
Jasper v. Sawyer, 100 F. Supp. 421, 1951 USAvR 516, D.D.C.
(October 3, 1951).
A property owner applied for the convening of a three judge statutory
court in an action to enjoin the Secretary of Commerce from taking his
property by eminent domain for airport purposes. The application was
based on the ground that the federal statute authorizing the taking of land
for airport purposes was unconstitutional. The application was denied on
the ground that there was clearly no question but that this federal power
was constitutional as an exercise of the power over interstate and foreign
commerce.
EVIDENCE - RES IPSA LOQUITUR - DISAPPEARANCE OF PAS-
SENGER AIRPLANE WITHOUT TRACE
Haasman v. Pacific Alaska Air Express,
100 F. Supp. 1, 1951 USAvR 479, D. Alaska (October 5, 1951).
Plaintiffs are personal representatives of passengers on defendant's
airplane which disappeared without a trace on a flight from Yakutat, Alaska
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to Seattle, Washington. Defendant contends that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is inapplicable to this case because it had no knowledge of the
cause of loss of the airplane greater than that possessed by the plaintiffs.
The court, however, held the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applicable, saying
that the rule precluding application of the doctrine where the plaintiff's
knowledge is equal to that of the defendant is applied to cases where plain-
tiff actually has equal knowledge or where knowledge is equally accessible
to plaintiff, and not where, as here, there is an equality of ignorance be-
tween plaintiff and defendant.
SOVEREIGNTY - APPLICATION OF CAA SAFETY REGULATIONS
TO OPERATIONS OF PRIVATE PLANES OUTSIDE
UNITED STATES
Hansen v. Arabian American Oil Co.,
100 F. Supp. 183, 1951 USAvR 76, E.D.N.Y. (October 10, 1951).
A pilot who contracted to fly private airplanes for the oil. company
outside the United States alleged breach on contract on the part of the oil
company for ordering him to disregard safety regulations of the CAA.
There was no provision in the written contract that airplanes should be
flown in conformity with CAA regulations. It was held that the CAA
regulations were not part of the contract by implication, because the Civil
Aeronautics Act applies only to operations which involve commerce within
or with the United States. Summary judgment for the defendant.
TORTS - MUNICIPAL LIABILITY - AIRPORT - INVITEES -
UNMARKED HAZARDS
Behnke v. City of Moberly, Missouri,
- Mo. App. -, 243 S.W. 2d 549, 1951 USAvR 510 (November 5,
1951).
A municipality which owns and operates an airport was held by the court
to be exercising a proprietary function, and was therefore liable for torts,
citing Dysart v. City of St. Louis, 321 Mo. 514, 11 S.W. 2d 1045 (1928). A
pilot using the field is an invitee, not a mere licensee, and therefore the
municipality had a duty to exercise reasonable care for his safety, and warn
him of an unmarked hazard.
INSURANCE - AVIATION LIABILITY EXCLUSION CLAUSE -
DETERMINATION OF CAUSE OF DEATH
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Smith,
- F. 2d. - , 5th Cir. (November 23, 1951).
Insured, when last seen was starting on a plane trip from Puerto Rico
to Trinidad, in a land based plane. The plane, when last seen, was entering
a storm front in the open seas. There were no life preservers on the plane.
The life insurance policy here sued on had an aviation liability exclusion
clause. In the lower court the jury found that there was insufficient evi-
dence to show that the insured's death resulted from riding in an airplane.
The court of appeals reversed and granted the defendant its motion for a
judgment n.o.v., holding that, though the burden of proof is on the insurer
to establish that the insured's death resulted from a cause within the
exclusionary clause of the policy, here the jury's finding is not supported
by any substantial evidence or reasonable inference therefrom. The insur-
er's burden of proof does not include the exclusion of every conceivable
remote cause of death.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
CONTRACTS - WARSAW CONVENTION - NATIONAL OF NON-
SIGNATORY POWER - EFFECT OF TARIFF PROVISION
REQUIRING NOTICE OF DAMAGE CLAIMS
Glenn v. Compania Cubanna de Aviacion,
- F. Supp. , 20 L.W. 2337, S.D. Fla. (February 1, 1952).
(1) A Cuban airline's liability for damages resulting from the crash
death of passengers on a Miami-Havana flight is governed by the Warsaw
Convention of 1929, 49 STAT. 3000 (1934), even though Cuba is not a party
thereto. Article I. of the Convention bases applicability of the Convention
entirely on the international character of the transportation, making no
reference to the nationality of the carrier or the passengers.
(2) Failure to comply with the airline's tariff provision requiring 30
days' notice of damage claims as a prerequisite to suit thereon does not bar
the wrongful death action under the principle of Gootch v. Oregon Short
Line R. Co., 258 U.S. 22 (1922), because here, unlike the Gootch case, the
tariff provision did not, appear on the face of the plane tickets of the de-
ceased.
DESTRUCTION OF AIRPLANE - NEGLIGENCE OF REPAIR CO.
Lewis V. Jensent Et Al
- Wash. -235 P 2d 312 (September 5, 1951)
A plane which was left overnight at an airport for servicing was taken
out of the hangar and flown without permission and destroyed in a crash.
The court found that failure to remove the keys as requested by the owner
was a breach of contract and, therefore, the repair company is liable for
any damages resulting thereafter.
NONCERTIFIED AIR FREIGHT CARRIERS-POWER OF CIVIL
AERONAUTICS BOARD TO ISSUE TEMPORARY CERTIFICATES
-DEVELOPMENT AND PROMOTION OF AIR TRANSPORTATION
American Airlines Inc. Et Al V. CAB
F. 2d (D.C. Cir. Sept. 27, 1951)
An order of the Civil Aeronautics Board which provided that temporary
certificates would be issued to certain non-certified freight carriers author-
izing them to engage in regularly scheduled transportation of property was
affirmed upon judicial review. The court found that the Board was acting
within its statutory function in basing its decision not "so much upon past
and current acts, as upon a consideration of the future of air freight trans-
portation.
